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Abstract
The role of Forensic Science Regulator (FSR), created in 2007, was established
to assure the achievement and maintenance of forensic science service (FSS)
provision that commands public confidence. The FSR works at an organiza-
tional level, to assure, and improve the quality of forensic service provision
and manage the risks of quality failures by Forensic Service Providers (FSPs).
Despite this apparent introduction of “regulation,” forensic science provision
in the United Kingdom has continued to receive a critical assessment. FSPs are
meant to voluntarily adopt the Regulator's quality standards, achieve and
maintain accreditation, and comply with regulatory requirements and guid-
ance, including reporting complaints and quality failures to the Regulator. The
effectiveness of the FSR thus cannot be gauged by examination of the actions
of the Regulator alone, but also requires evidence of impact upon FSPs. Using
public data, supplemented by interviews with FSS providers, to facilitate an
initial assessment of whether the FSR's role is “fit for purpose,” we outline five
demands made of FSPs in delivering FSSs to the criminal justice system and
the five objectives of the FSR to support and enhance the ability of FSPs to
meet these demands. We provide a prefatory commentary on whether the FSR
is able to effectively fulfill this purpose. It is argued that the FSR role in its cur-
rent form cannot be considered “fit for purpose” when evidence of the impact
of regulation is lacking. Finally, we briefly summarize “inhibitors” that prevent
the FSR from being more effective.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The need for forensic science to be regulated (should be) widely accepted once the vulnerabilities inherent in forensic
science are recognized, and their deleterious impact on the criminal justice system (CJS) acknowledged. These include
activities that present opportunity for risks of errors and mistakes during the analysis and testing of evidential materials
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and/or the interpretation of the resulting evidence, such as misconduct and negligence of forensic practitioners, incon-
sistent laboratory practices, and misinterpretation of test and analytical results (Gabel, 2014). While internationally
there may have been reluctance and hesitation to introduce forensic science regulation,1 where it has been instigated,
there have been different approaches taken or recommended (Butler, 2017; Tontarski Jr, Houck, Grose, &
Gialamas, 2012). In 2007, the UK government created the role of the Forensic Science Regulator (FSR).2 The FSR is a
progeny of various recommendations aimed at preventing errors and quality failures, which may lead to miscarriages of
justice, unjustified acquittals, or flawed/failed criminal investigations. Despite this innovation, and the hopes that seem-
ingly intractable problems with forensic science would now be addressed, forensic science provision has continued to
attract criticism (House of Lords, 2019). Ascertaining the effectiveness of the FSR is thus necessary to determine the
contribution of the FSR to the aim of an effective criminal justice process, albeit, it is highly unlikely that a single regu-
latory solution would be capable of addressing all of the diverse vulnerabilities present when forensic science interacts
with the criminal process. Any assessment must appreciate that solutions to certain problems might simultaneously cre-
ate or exacerbate other tensions elsewhere in this complex interdependent system (Roberts, 2015), and “inhibitors” may
impede or annul regulatory efforts.
Quality assurance regulators will primarily aim to either “assure” or “improve” the quality of service. If the main
purpose is to provide assurance, then quality standards are expected to be set at a minimum acceptable level of quality
and a level that will be easily attainable by most (if not all) organizations. However, if the improvement of quality is the
main purpose, standards and targets will be set to challenge the status quo and help organizations identify areas for
development (Sutherland et al., 2006). We argue that, given the many criticisms of forensic science that provoked the
creation of the FSR role, the effectiveness of the FSR role in achieving their purpose should be assessed within this dual
assurance/improvement framework. In respect of the FSR role, the success, or otherwise, of the FSR in achieving these
dual objectives has previously been interrogated by studying the work of the FSR via reports and publications primarily
emanating from the FSR's office (McCartney & Amoako, 2018, 2019). But whether the role is fit for purpose is depen-
dent upon both the ability of the Regulator to execute the role (duties) of the FSR and the correlation between these
duties and the achievement of the aims of regulation. Whether the FSR is effective or not can thus be gauged by exami-
nation simply of the actions of the Regulator alone but rather whether those actions achieve outcomes against the pur-
pose for which regulation was created.
Scrutiny of the work of the Regulator is thus insufficient to gain evidence of regulatory effectiveness, it requires evi-
dence of impact upon the work of individual FSPs. For instance, has the regulation led to FSPs adopting the FSR
codes,3 and gaining and maintaining accreditation? Are quality failures now minimized, and reported upon and
remedied when they do occur? Are improvements to quality service provision taking place through validation of foren-
sic science methods? Have FSPs sought to improve their service delivery in response to regulation? To supplement pub-
lic documents and publications, forensic scientists and other stakeholders were interviewed (n = 18), reporting that
both the role and restrictions on the Regulator in executing the role, as well as external pressures, means that reforms
are necessary to improve the effectiveness of regulation.
2 | THE FSR ROLE
2.1 | Rationale for the creation of the FSR role
Recommendations for regulating forensic science in England and Wales date back to, at least, the early 1990s. Some
wrongful conviction cases in the 1970s and 1980s in which unreliable forensic evidence had played a part and had
undermined public confidence in the criminal justice process led to the establishment of a Royal Commission on Crimi-
nal Justice in 1991. With respect to the role of forensic science and other expert evidence, chapter nine of the Commis-
sion's report in 1993 recommended the establishment of a Forensic Science Advisory Council (FSAC) with a broad
range of responsibilities. These responsibilities included overseeing the training of, and accreditation forensic scientists,
as well as creating a Code of Practice (Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 1993, p. 144). After a series of reports by
experts and government Working Groups further raised the need for regulation (Black, 2003; Kershaw, 2000), and fol-
lowing further forensic “failures,” in particular in the Damilola Taylor investigation and prosecution, which led to
widespread criticism, and further recommendations for forensic regulation (Rawley & Caddy, 2007), the Council for
Registration of Forensic Practitioners (CRFP) was eventually established in 1999. The CRFP encountered significant
problems, and in 2005, a House of Commons Science and Technology Committee again recommended the creation of
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an FSAC to “oversee the regulation of the forensic science market and provide independent and impartial advice
on forensic science.” (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, 2005, p. 28). This was also prompted by
the increasing commercialization of forensic science which had been initiated by two key changes in forensic service
provision in England and Wales in the 1990s. These were the conversion of the Forensic Science Service (FSS) as an
executive agency of the Home Office and the introduction of direct charging for FSSs which led to competition
between the FSS and private FSPs for forensic service supply to police forces. The Government in 2007, rejected the rec-
ommendation for an FSAC and instead created the FSR as an independent regulator for the quality of forensic service
provision. Even though the Regulator was never created with the capacity or remit to regulate the forensic “market,” it
was welcomed as an improvement on the CRFP, which alone was insufficient to regulate the evolving and changing
forensic science landscape, and was closed down soon after in 2009. The view in support of the introduction of the FSR
role explained that:
“Modern regulation of practitioner competence must take place in…the quality standards framework that
is being developed to regulate quality standards at three levels: provider (all law enforcement and commer-
cial suppliers of forensic services), practitioner and method (forensic science techniques). Assessment of
practitioner competence is best achieved as part of an assessment of standards across-the-board, not as a
stand-alone evaluation. The recommendation is for regulation of practitioner competence to be integrated
into the accreditation of broader standards.” (Forensic Science Regulator, 2009, p. 6)
While some had argued that the registration of practitioners did create, maintain, and promote public confidence in
the use of forensic science (Jamieson & Kershaw, 2000), the CRFP register could never wholly achieve this purpose
however, due to the voluntariness of registration and ultimately, lack of sufficient funding, as hopes for the Council to
become financially independent could not be realized through membership registration fees (Flanagan, 2018;
Sommer, 2011). The CRFP's focus on “regulating” individual forensic science practitioners but not the organizations
and the delivery of forensic science, stemmed from a belief that once the standards and values of individual forensic
practitioners are set (and stay) high, the way an employer organizes and manages work becomes a secondary issue
(Jamieson & Kershaw, 2000). This belief is perhaps understandable given that historically, criticisms of forensic science
failings have focused on individual practitioners. However, as the landscape of forensic service provision was expanding
and changing, it became clear that the CRFP was alone insufficient as a regulatory framework.
Expert reviews made recommendations about the remit, responsibilities, and management of the FSR (Rawley &
Caddy, 2007). The FSR has been given a broader remit, encompassing oversight for the processes carried out within FSPs
which affect the quality of the FSSs provided and new scientific techniques introduced in or adopted by FSPs before those
techniques are introduced. In the complex landscape of FSS provision in the United Kingdom, comprising police forces,
private FSPs, (from multi-national companies to sole traders/consultants), and other public organizations (public laborato-
ries/universities, etc.), it is the role of the FSR to ensure that all providers are bound by the same regulatory requirements
regardless of status. The vision of the FSR, as of 2009, was for forensic science to be delivered to the CJS that consistently
meet high-quality standards and integrity expected by the courts and the general public. To achieve this, the Regulator
was to provide direction and unity of approach to achieving forensic science quality standards across the United Kingdom;
place quality at the center of all forensic science activities; and create a quality standards framework around the full range
of forensic processes (Rennison, 2009).
3 | HOW TO ASSESS WHETHER THE FSR IS “FIT FOR PURPOSE”?
The first business plan of the FSR stated that “the purpose of the FSR is to support and enhance the important contribu-
tion made by suppliers of forensic science services to the effectiveness of the [CJS]” (Rennison, 2008, p. 1). In our opin-
ion, this was in line with the FSR's vision and was commensurate with the fact that in the delivery of FSSs to the CJS
by FSPs, the Regulator can only support FSPs to ensure that the services they deliver will meet the required level of
quality. This view has recently been reiterated that “to ensure we have effective scrutiny [of scientific evidence] and to
ensure that the public retains confidence in the [criminal justice] system we must make sure we see the regulations and
rules as supportive not superfluous”.4 In what appears a slight variation in the purpose of the FSR, the second
appointed Regulator in her first annual report recorded that “[t]he post of Forensic Science Regulator was established
in order to ensure that the provision of forensic science and forensic pathology across the Criminal Justice System (CJS)
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of England and Wales is subject to an appropriate regime of scientific quality standards” (Tully, 2015, p. 4). Thus, what
was initially recorded as the vision of the FSR is presently recorded as the purpose of the FSR.
Despite this slight variance, it is clear that the quality of forensic science is central to the FSR role, for which reason
FSPs are required to comply with the regulator's quality standard requirements and guidelines. Quality is defined in the
FSR Codes as the totality of features and characteristics of a product or service that bear on its ability to satisfy stated or
implied needs (The Forensic Science Regulator, 2020). To ascertain whether the FSR is achieving this “quality assur-
ance” purpose will, therefore, require the knowledge and understanding of the stated or implied needs that forensic sci-
ence (or FSPs) are expected to fulfill, ultimately, in the CJS and how this may have been affected by regulation.
In 2008, the Regulator set out the objectives of the CJS as far as the delivery of forensic services by all FSPs is con-
cerned (Table 1). According to the FSR, the objectives of the FSR set by the Secretary of State for the Home Department
(Table 2) were in support of these overarching objectives (Forensic Science Regulator, 2013; Rennison, 2008). In our
opinion, despite the slight amendment of the purpose of the FSR in recent years, this has not made the objectives for
forensic service delivery originally set out by the FSR any less relevant. As far as the objectives of the Criminal Proce-
dure Rules (CPR) for expert evidence (Part 19) and (efficient) case management (Part 3) are concerned, the information
in Table 1 is far-reaching and as relevant as today in setting objectives for FSPs. Most importantly, the FSR Codes and
other regulatory guidelines set the requirements for how FSPs should meet these criminal justice objectives, including
professional standards and conduct; reliability; integrity; impartiality; and accuracy of the work of FSPs throughout the
process of forensic service provision. This relationship between the FSR role and the information in Table 1 makes the
latter a relevant benchmark for tracing the impact of the Regulator's programme of work on the quality of forensics sci-
ence at the level of individual FSPs.
However, it is noted that the FSR role was never intended to singularly deliver all forensic science quality objectives.
Where structures, processes, and organizations existed to deliver any of the objectives of the FSR, the expectation was for
the FSR to work through support and coordinated activities, where appropriate to achieve these objectives (Forensic Sci-
ence Regulator, 2013; Rennison, 2008). Therefore, the impact of any agency or existing structures that deliver some of the
objectives in Table 1 should be considered when gauging the effectiveness of the FSR role. This includes the impact of the
TABLE 1 Requirements of the CJS of FSPs and the FSR capacity to enhance/support FSPs
The CJS Requires, of all FSPs Is the FSR Role Effective in Enhancing/Supporting FSPs?
1. The delivery of forensic science services,
using the appropriate available scientific
techniques, according to the highest
professional standards
The FSR has established uniform quality standards (FSR codes). However, neither
the Regulator nor UKAS instruct FSPs as to which scientific technique (method/
procedure) is “most appropriate,” so different FSPs can be accredited for the same
work but use different techniques
2. With efficiency, integrity, impartiality, and
accuracy at every stage throughout the
process
The FSR can only establish and monitor quality standards at an organizational level;
has limited remit over all the stages of the process; and has limited influence over
“efficiency” as variables are outside FSR remit. FSPs are expected to develop their
own procedures to ensure integrity, impartiality, and accuracy. We do not know
whether these are effective because no evidence on the impact of the codes, but
failures continue to be reported
3. At a cost that represents best value for
money, within timescales that meet
operational needs
The FSR has no input over contracting so limited influence over cost or time-scales.
However, the requirements of accreditation place a cost burden on all FSPs which
also impacts upon costs and timescales of individual FSPs. Thus, the cost of
accreditation is a serious consideration and some FSPs have found it prohibitively
expensive
4. Reflecting an understanding of the needs of
the specific customer and the requirements of
the CJS as a whole
The “needs” of the CJS can be overborne by contractual requirements (most often
with police forces who set their requirements as “customer”). May not be
alignment between the customer and CJS needs and police procurement of
commoditized forensic analysis indicates a divergence between the needs of the
customer and the requirements of the CJS
5. Maintaining and enhancing public
confidence in the quality and reliability of
forensic science in the CJS
Meeting the first four requirements should secure public confidence. The FSR role
cannot assure quality/reliability by simply establishing and monitoring standards
and “persuading” FSPs to seek and maintain accreditation. Structural defects in
the current marketplace, from the crime scene to court, may militate against the
quality of forensic science more than the Regulator's role can counteract
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forensic science marketplace which (may) deliver cost and service delivery objectives. The Crown Prosecution Service has
also established five key requirements that demand FSPs to comply with the FSR Codes, accreditation, and other guide-
lines for efficient case management as required by the CPR, such as Disclosure and Streamlined Forensic Reporting (SFR)
(The Crown Prosecution Service, n.d.). These requirements overlap with those set in the FSR Codes and other regulatory
guidelines, such as the Regulator's Legal Obligation Guidance (Forensic Science Regulator, 2020). In our opinion, even
though multiple requirements for FSPs set by different agencies pose difficulties, in terms of identifying and selecting the
relevant benchmark to assess the quality of forensic science, overlaps between requirements reinforce the fact that several
bodies have a role to play (including supporting the FSR role) to ensure that forensic services provided by FSPs will con-
tinually meet the needs of the CJS.
Assessing whether the FSR is fit for purpose is, therefore, complicated. Even where there are some agreed benchmarks
or indicators for effective regulation, contentions arise with different assessments of their weight and relevance. One
method commonly used for assessing regulatory effectiveness is “input-based” assessment. This probes issues such as how
the FSR initiates and implements programmes and actions and the resources devoted to them. Stakeholder reports,
including the FSR annual reports, provide information about the extent to which the Regulator is undertaking duties that
may assist in achieving their objectives. Secondly, process or compliance-based assessments measure how individual FSPs
comply with quality standard requirements, regulatory guidelines, and recommendations. While such measures are
important, they are insufficient to demonstrate that the quality of forensic service provision has improved as a result of
the regulation. What is lacking is an assessment of the extent to which the regulatory programmes (quality standards,
accreditation, and investigation of quality failures) are achieving outcomes at the level of forensic science provision across
all FSPs, and the extent to which these outcomes fulfill the purpose of the FSR. Less commonly undertaken, these
outcome-based assessments are vital in linking regulatory outcomes to regulatory purposes, stressing the connection
between regulatory action and effect on the ground (Baldwin, Cave, & Lodge, 2012). There is currently a gap in knowledge
about the impact that forensic regulation in the United Kingdom is actually having on the quality of forensic science
(Tully, 2019). Using public data, supplemented by interviews with FSS providers, we outline here the five demands made
of FSPs in delivering FSSs to the CJS and the five objectives of the FSR to support and enhance the ability of FSPs to meet
these demands, as set out in this first FSR business report. We provide a prefatory commentary on whether the FSR is “fit
for purpose”. Finally, we summarize brief note “inhibitors” that are preventing the FSR from being more effective.
TABLE 2 The objectives of the FSR and whether the role enables the FSR to meet these objectives
Objectives of the FSR Can the Regulator Fulfill These Objectives?
1. To establish, and monitor compliance with,
quality standards in the provision of forensic
science services to the police service and the
wider CJS
Has established quality standards (at organizational level) for many
disciplines/techniques, but some forensic science provision continues
without adherence to FSR standards
2. To ensure the accreditation of those
supplying forensic science services to the
police, including in-house police services and
forensic suppliers to the wider CJS
Currently, no powers to enforce accreditation so FSPs can operate
outside of regulation
3. To set and monitor compliance with, quality
standards applying to national forensic
science intelligence databases, beginning with
the National DNA Database (NDNAD) and
the National Ballistics Intelligence System
(NBIS) and extending to others as they arise
FSR does have standards for forensic DBs, but the role entails some
overlap with other bodies involved in oversight of these forensic DBs,
delineation of exact roles lacking clarity in some instances which can
lead to confusion
4. To provide advice to ministers, CJS
organizations, suppliers and others as seems
appropriate, on matters related to quality
standards in forensic science
FSR provides advice, but confusion over role and frustration at
apparent inability to address all concerns over forensic science
quality since inception
5. To deal with complaints from stakeholders
and members of the public in relation to
quality standards in the provision of forensic
science services
FSR role (now) improved capacity (whistle-blower line) but the unclear
extent of under-reporting. “Scandals” demonstrate quality still an
issue. Efforts to address with “lessons learnt”
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3.1 | Does the FSR assist FSPs in meeting their demands?
Table one details what the CJS requires of FSPs, as set out in the first FSR business plan, and considers whether the
FSR can support and enhance the ability of FSPs to meet these requirements.
3.1.1 | The delivery of forensic science services, using the appropriate available
scientific techniques, according to the highest professional standards
Any measure of effectiveness must capture the extent to which the FSR is impacting the development, and use of
appropriate scientific techniques across FSPs. Although the FSR Codes have been developed, these set the require-
ments for quality management systems for FSPs, these are not “best practice” procedures, protocols, or methods
for forensic service provision (Wilson-Wilde, 2018). Individual FSPs can develop their own “standard operating
procedures” (SOPs) that conform to the relevant requirements in the Codes, however, their accreditation by United
Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) does not necessarily mean that an individual FSP is using the “most appro-
priate” scientific technique. Different FSPs providing the same FSS can be accredited to the same quality standard
but use different validated methods and procedures. Whether FSPs are reaching the “highest professional stan-
dards” would require ongoing monitoring and regular inspections and peer review of processes, which are beyond
the capacity of the FSR.
3.1.2 | With efficiency, integrity, impartiality, and accuracy at every stage throughout
the process
Neither quality standards nor accreditation to the FSR Codes is reliably indicative of the “efficiency, integrity, impartial-
ity, and accuracy” of forensic science. The FSR can only establish standards at an organizational level and has very lim-
ited remit over all stages of the process (i.e., does not yet cover crime scene analysis, submissions, expert evidence
presentation at court, or many other important elements of the “process”). The FSR also has limited influence over
“efficiency” as variables that dictate this are again outside FSR remit. FSPs are expected to develop their own proce-
dures to ensure integrity, impartiality, and accuracy, and oversee the work of their employees. Given reports of manage-
ment failings within police forces (Evans, 2018) and at Randox Testing Service (BBC News, 2018), we know that
failures to supervise staff occur even within accredited organizations. While the Regulator has this as a high-priority
area to look into, failures continue to be reported.
3.1.3 | At a cost which represents best value for money, within timescales which meet
operational needs
The FSR has no input into the procurement of FSSs in the marketplace, and, so has limited influence over the cost or
timescales of forensic service delivery. However, the cost of accreditation impacts the delivery costs of FSPs, and private
FSPs may not be achieving a return on investment, forcing them to leave the market or ceasing some services. Accredi-
tation has thus added to the financial costs of FSPs, many of whom have left the market and others who continue to
face significant financial problems (mitigating regulatory actions improving quality).
3.1.4 | Reflecting an understanding of the needs of the specific customer and the
requirements of the CJS as a whole
The FSR Codes and other regulatory guidance documents, such as the “Legal Obligation Guidance” have been developed in
line with the requirements in the Criminal Procedure Rules and Criminal Procedure Directions (Part 19). Hence, these docu-
ments may reflect the “needs” of the CJS. However, the “needs” of the CJS can be largely overborne by contractual require-
ments, most often with police forces who will set out their requirements as the “specific customer.” There may not always
be alignment between this “customer” and CJS needs, which encompasses more interested parties than simply the police
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(i.e., the defense). For example, defects in SFR and police procurement of commoditized forensic analysis indicates a clear
divergence between the needs of customer and the requirements of the CJS (see McCartney & Amoako, 2019).
3.1.5 | Maintaining and enhancing public confidence in the quality and reliability of
forensic science in the CJS
Overall, meeting these four objectives above should secure public confidence forensic science in the CJS. Yet the FSR
role cannot assure quality and reliability by simply establishing and monitoring standards and “persuading” FSPs to
seek and maintain accreditation (McCartney & Amoako, 2019). It can be seen in respect of the first four requirements,
that the FSR is often poorly placed to enhance and support FSPs to meet all these requirements. Structural defects in
the current marketplace provision of forensic service, from the crime scene to court, militates the regulatory actions to
improve the quality of forensic science, perhaps making more of an impact than the Regulator's role can counteract.
For instance, according to the Regulator, service provision contracts that require FSPs to include abbreviated reports
without additional charge pose risks where scientists are summoned to give evidence without having had the opportu-
nity to go through the formal process of developing a scientifically supported inference that has been appropriately
peer-reviewed (Tully, 2019, p. 35).
3.2 | Does the FSR meet their objectives?
3.2.1 | To establish, and monitor compliance with, quality standards in the provision of
forensic science services to the police service and the wider CJS
Prior to the creation of the FSR, quality standards for forensic service provision were managed through different
approaches (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, 2011, p. 168). In addition to the registration of
some forensic practitioners by the CRFP, the FSS and the major private laboratories by then had their own quality
assurance systems incorporated into accreditation by the UKAS. However, UKAS did not require the specified stan-
dards, such as for the accuracy and precision in analytical measurement and activities outside the laboratory, and each
laboratory defined its own standards, resulting in no uniform standard for forensic analysis across the board of FSPs
(Gough, 1997). Thus, establishing the FSR Codes of Practice and Conduct as a single framework of quality standard
requirements for the accreditation of all FSPs is a positive achievement, as it creates a level playing field for accredita-
tion and standards for forensic service provision. Yet failures to achieve full accreditation across the board have contin-
ued to cause the FSR problems, with some FSPs providing forensic services without being accredited to the FSR
standards, and some areas remaining without specific standards (e.g., digital forensics). The FSR annual reports show
that the number of FSPs gaining or maintaining accreditation is increasing but satisfactory progress against accredita-
tion deadlines has been difficult. This is being partially addressed over time, but still fuels the demand for statutory
powers to make accreditation mandatory and the FSR has (partial) enforcement powers in the Forensic Science Regula-
tor Bill.5 There are also increasing numbers of quality failures being reported to the FSR, showing that some FSPs are
compliant with regulatory requirements to report, albeit failures are still occurring.
3.2.2 | To ensure the accreditation of those supplying forensic science services to the
police, including in-house police services and forensic suppliers to the wider CJS
The benefit of accreditation to ISO quality standards is derived from how the accreditation process can be used to drive
improvements across the organization, including positive impacts on customer satisfaction, employee satisfaction, labo-
ratory performance, and competitive advantage (Karthiyayini & Rajendran, 2017). The impact on laboratory processes
can be ascertained through laboratories' throughput time; technical flexibility; coordination of activities; quality of
product specifications; internal delivery performance; external delivery performance; and efficiency (Singels, Ruël, &
Water, 2001). Performance indicators based on crime scene activities and evidence dissemination to customers are
also suggested (King & Maguire, 2009). These include FSPs ability to properly examine crime scenes and process
evidence; produce accurate forensic analysis and results; and disseminate forensic results in a clear digestible manner.
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However, evidence of effectiveness that the FSR Codes are ensuring consistency of quality, and the maintenance of
high-quality general and discipline-specific forensic science procedures across FSPs are still scarce, and the Codes
are not comprehensive across the entire criminal process. With recent cases of quality failures occurring even in
accredited FSPs, assessment of the effectiveness of the FSR should determine whether or not FSPs may be comply-
ing with the FSR accreditation requirements for their instrumental value (to secure contracts) rather than (or in
addition to) the substantive value for changing operations and procedures to improve service delivery performance
(King & Maguire, 2009).
The accreditation process is undertaken by UKAS (not the FSR directly), and can be prohibitively expensive, and
time-consuming. Accreditation in general provides a snapshot of a laboratory's operations at a specific point in time
and cannot guarantee that the quality of work would be produced at the same level of standard—the level can improve,
remain the same or reduce (Jones, 2016). However, where accreditation is maintained for several cycles, this should
ensure that a minimum standard of practice is established and that methods are properly documented, properly per-
formed, and reliably reported (Jones, 2016). Thus, in addition to counting the number of FSPs gaining accreditation,
the measurement of effectiveness should also capture a much broader range of variation in the work of FSPs over time,
to verify claims of the importance of quality standards and accreditation, such as providing transparency of and confi-
dence in the systems, services, and products of FSPs (Ross & Davey, 2016).
In addition, FSPs abiding by the same quality standard requirements is not an end of itself but rather a means of
achieving the goal of quality forensic service provision. How they fulfill the requirements can also vary (see Sec-
tion 3.1.1). Whether voluntary or mandatory, backed up by statutory penalties, regulation, and enforcement of accredi-
tation is expected to promote good practice for FSPs, including a positive influence on organizational culture and the
individual work ethos of FSPs. However, if regulation and accreditation are too onerous, expensive, and not viewed as
necessary, then the cost of accreditation can be prohibitive such that it will risk the importance of accreditation as a
means to invoke learning and promote continuous improvement (Rankin & Thompson, 2016; Wilson, Gahan, Robert-
son, & Lennard, 2018).
3.2.3 | To set and monitor compliance with, quality standards applying to national
forensic science intelligence databases, beginning with the National DNA Database
(NDNAD) and the National Ballistics Intelligence System (NBIS) and extending to others
as they arise
The FSR does have standards for these forensic databases, but this role entails some overlap with other bodies involved
in oversight of these, and delineation of exact roles is lacking clarity in some instances.
3.2.4 | To provide advice to ministers, CJS organizations, suppliers and others as seems
appropriate, on matters related to quality standards in forensic science
The FSR continues to provide advice and has fed into major inquiries on forensic science, as well as other matters
touching upon forensic science. There is still apparent confusion over the FSR role, however (such as whether the FSR
should be involved in issues around areas such as Automated Facial Recognition) and frustration at the apparent inabil-
ity of the FSR to address all concerns over forensic science quality. This frustration was made clear in the House of
Lords 2019 inquiry, where it was made evident that the FSR role was limited, requiring many more witnesses and
experts to provide evidence to the inquiry committee.
3.2.5 | To deal with complaints from stakeholders and members of the public in
relation to quality standards in the provision of forensic science services
The FSR role now has improved capacity with the introduction of a “whistle-blower hotline,” but it remains unclear
the extent of under-reporting of failures, even though reports continue to increase (which could show a positive willing-
ness to report—which is a good outcome—or could show that regulation is failing to improve standards as failures are
increasing—a bad outcome). Recent “scandals” have demonstrated that quality failures are still an issue albeit the FSR
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is addressing failures with the addition of public “lessons learnt”; reports on failure investigations and how lessons
should be shared across FSPs.
4 | THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE REGULATOR: INHIBITORS
In the United Kingdom, the demand for “quality forensic science” by the CJS, should be a yardstick for assessing
whether the work of FSPs is of good quality (in addition to scientific validity/reliability criteria). Given that the FSR
plays an intermediary role for this achievement of quality across FSPs, the effectiveness of the FSR should be evidenced
by how its programme of work impacts the delivery of forensic service by FSPs. As we saw in the previous section, effec-
tiveness in this regard is often limited. This gap persists despite expectations of the FSR, including to reduce the risk of
quality failings impeding or preventing the identification, prosecution, and conviction of offenders, by establishing, and
enforcing, quality standards for forensic science used in the investigation and prosecution of crime (Rennison, 2008,
p. 19). Interrogation of the role reveals a worrying lack of data about the impact of the FSR quality standards on the
quality of forensic science. The knowledge about the capacity of the FSR to exert a powerful influence over the ability
of FSPs to meet the demands of the CJS is still lacking.
More often, there are external drivers that may have a greater impact on FSPs. For instance, SFR which was intro-
duced as a solution to delays and cost is reportedly achieving cost purpose, however, this simultaneously introduces
new risks of misrepresentation, misunderstanding, and mistakes of forensic evidence (Edmond, Carr, & Piasecki, 2018).
The adverse implications of SFR on the quality and the interest of the FSR role are extensively discussed by the FSR
(Tully, 2017, 2020). While new guidance for SFR has been introduced to address some challenges, overall, the adverse
impact of SFR exemplifies a situation where solutions to certain problems simultaneously create other tensions else-
where in the complex interdependent system of the CJS. A critical aspect of the capacity of the appointed Regulator to
perform the role is the institutional design, funding, and workforce devoted to the FSR. However, the Regulator has reg-
ularly faced budget cuts, despite facing an ever-greater number of quality-related referrals and ongoing support required
for FSPs working toward achieving the quality standards (Tully, 2020). Appropriate workforce capacity, institutional
structures and a remit that stretches from end-to-end of the forensic process, and adequate funding are essential if the
FSR is expected to improve the quality of forensic science.
Most importantly, the impact of the forensic marketplace to date has largely been detrimental to the quality of
forensic science in the United Kingdom and continues to threaten quality, annulling the interest in, and the work of
the FSR. For instance, even though it is in the interests of the FSR that FSPs or practitioners who have not adopted
the relevant quality standards will not be routinely instructed, reports suggest otherwise (Tully, 2018, p. 23). In its
review of FSS provision in 1993, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice foresaw competition in forensic service
provision as a way of ensuring that the charges made by public sector laboratories were reasonable and the services
met customer needs. In recommending the creation of an FSAC, one of the remits of a Council would have been to
ensure that undue competitiveness did not lead to a diminution in standards (Royal Commission on Criminal
Justice, 1993, p. 148). However, the role of the FSR “concerns only quality standards…and have no remit to regulate
the market for forensic science” (Tully, 2018, p. 29). The regulation of the forensic “market” is left to the dynamics of
police procurement frameworks, charging mechanisms, and competition between private FSPs. Police forces, either
individually or as part of regional consortia, are expected to demand higher standards as part of their procurement
processes when purchasing forensic services (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, 2005, p. 28).
During procurement, there is often a requirement for FSPs to be accredited to relevant standards, thus FSR quality
standards can influence contracting, but accreditation is not always a requirement and there are reports of some FSPs
and individual practitioners who have not adopted the relevant quality standards being instructed to provide services.
Continuing cuts to police spending means FSSs are commissioned as commoditized products, driven by price. Several
reviews of the forensic marketplace indicate that more forensic services have been moved by police “in-house” where
accreditation is rarer (Lawless, 2010, 2011).
The forensic science marketplace is also increasingly fragile. Competition between FSPs has resulted in price reduc-
tions of forensic analyses, improvements in the turnaround times for forensic tests, and improvements in the quality of
the work (Bandy & Hartley, 2018). However, others express a contrary view that commercialization has led to a decline
in standards (Doyle, 2020) and threatens the collapse of private provision entirely if FSPs cannot be financially
sustained. Consequently, the market is unattractive to potential investors, and “bargain basement” forensics work
against high-quality forensic services (Walport, 2015). There are also quality-related consequences due to wider
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structural failings, such as the introduction of SFR and the cuts to Legal Aid both of which negatively impact upon pri-
marily defense forensic science. A question remaining, therefore, is whether the FSR role allows the appointed Regula-
tor to meet their objectives given these external pressures. Careful consideration should be given to how the framework
of the FSR is integrated into the end-to-end criminal justice process. Providing statutory regulatory powers for the FSR
to enforce accreditation is arguably only a partial answer. The environmental conditions of forensic service provision
should ensure that relevant reforms to the FSR that ensure the sustainability of FSPs and not further risk their survival
in the market, and encourage high-quality provision.
5 | CONCLUSION
To contribute to the provision of forensic science service that meets the requirements of the CJS, the FSR requires all
FSPs to comply with the FSR Codes and guidelines. The FSR should thus be able to demonstrate the extent to which
regulatory actions are impacting forensic service delivery. Yet information on the outcome-oriented impact of the FSR
is scarce and often only indirectly related to the actual work of the FSR, while scrutiny of the work of the Regulator via
their annual reports is insufficient to gain evidence of regulatory effectiveness. Notwithstanding, determining the effec-
tiveness of the FSR is vital. Based on the CJS' requirement for quality forensic science, measures of regulatory effective-
ness should shift from input and compliance-based assessment to outcome-based assessment. From this, relevant
benchmarks and indicators must be identified that enable assessment of whether the FSR is able to assure and improve
the quality of forensic science. Evidence of outcome-oriented impact should also provide support for the necessity of
regulatory activities and any potential reforms to improve regulation (such as the FSR Bill). Bare numbers of quality
standards developed, and FSPs gaining accreditation, whether they show an increase or decrease, hides a far more com-
plex picture about the quality of the work of FSPs and the effectiveness of the FSR. The prefatory commentary here
aims to throw some light on whether the quality standard requirements and regulatory activities are able to make an
impact. The effectiveness of the Regulator should also then inform how the FSR role is best framed, and resourced,
including the capacity to counteract the negative effects of structural defects in the forensic science sector which impact
upon quality. These structural defects and external pressures, in addition to the limitations of the Regulator's role means
there is only limited capacity to execute the role in an effective manner. Wider reforms are thus necessary to improve
the effectiveness of regulation.
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ENDNOTES
1 We use the term “forensic science regulation” very broadly and not simply as a synonym for the FSR.
2 The FSR role is confined to England and Wales. However, both Scotland and Northern Ireland, through their respec-
tive forensic science authorities have agreed to adopt the Regulator's quality standards; and collaborate with the Regu-
lator in the establishment of the quality standards. The respective authorities from both jurisdictions have joined the
advisory groups of the regulator.
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3 The FSR Codes of Practice and Conduct (the Codes) detail the standards and norms of practice that should be adhered
to by all forensic science practitioners.
4 See Rt Hon Sir Brian Leveson's (President of the Queen's Bench Division and Head of Criminal Justice) speech at the
Forensic Science Regulator's 2018 Annual Conference. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/sir-
brian-leveson-speech-at-the-forensic-science-regulator-annual-conference.
5 This Bill is not discussed here, albeit it would potentially alter the effectiveness of the FSR, were it to come into effect.
However, the real impact is unclear and remains questionable, and may have other negative consequences.
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